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SEARCHING FOR THE JUSTIFICATION 
OF AMERICAN HAWKS’ POLICY
Hawks: prominent American Neoconservatives following hard-line and uncom-
promising attitude in foreign policy. This term is often used to define the benefi-
ciaries of the status quo, people holding the power who practice politics based on 
US preventive military interventionism. 11th September 2001 gave the American 
hawks the first opportunity ever to take over full control over short-term tenets of 
American federal policy. This was the first step in the fulfillment of their broader 
plan concerning foreign policy and proving the dominant position of America in 
contemporary geopolitical system.
The roots of current views of the neoconservatives who hold posts in the ad-
ministration of the 43rd president of the United States, George W. Bush, should be 
sought for at the threshold of the 1990s. The end of the Cold War was the moment 
that forced neoconservatives to change their concept of the foreign policy, as for 
over four decades it had been based on fighting communism. The question emerged: 
what objective to designate; what should the United States aim at as an actor on the 
international scene. The main debate focused around the question whether America 
should continue Wilson’s policy whose objective was to spread democracy in the 
world, or should it rather return to its former isolationism, so similar to the traditional 
Conservatives, and seek foundation in own, narrowly perceived interest.
The result of the debate was primarily a split within the Republican Party. On 
the one hand, there were further advocates of the “enlightened nationalism” suppor-
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the history of America, its tradition, and the wisdom of the Founding Fathers. They 
opposed any crusades for spreading democracy. Turning the back on the rotten Old 
World was one of the myths on which America was built. The United States – the 
land of the free, the land of plenty, and the land of moral self-improvement – was 
to develop independently of Europe, never becoming entangled into the debasing 
conflicts of states of the eastern hemisphere1 that were devoid of any scruples. On the 
other hand, there were primarily those neoconservatives who did not want returning 
to the past. The desired a broad scale campaign to support spreading democracy all 
over the world, with the hoped result of such activity being the broadening of the 
land of liberty.2
Irving Kristol, the godfather of neoconservatism, supporting the basing of 
the foreign policy on solely American interests. This, however, followed a broader 
line of thought that whatever America does for itself, it does also for others. Kristol 
believed that the interest of the United States goes far beyond the ordinary reason 
of State. Following this train of thought further, neoconservatives were persistently 
in favor of the United States’ audacity and readiness to defend its interest, even 
when its allies do not want or cannot support them. They became the champions 
of unilateral actions on the international scene: of such actions that will be deemed 
necessary from the point of view of the American raison d’être.3
Neoconservatives considered that the foreign policy in the post-Cold War 
period was to a great extent based on similar, if not the same, arguments that Ro-
nald Reagan used to crack down on the Soviet Union. Reagan, as we know, uncon-
ditionally believed that the United States is the chosen nation, whose obligation is 
to defend democracy both on the inside and abroad. The objective here was to be 
the universalization of the liberal democracy. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, neo-
conservatives followed a similar assumption, preaching that the diminishing safety 
of the United States diminishes parallel to the shrinking of the area of democracy, 
and the democracy and individual liberty are universal, and supporting them in the 
world is justified. For decades, the United States were treated by the democratic 
world as the guarantor of both political and economic liberty. In the new interna-
tional reality neoconservatives wanted America to make use of its advantage to 
enforce the international standards of conduct. At the threshold of the 1990s they 
believed that safety of the world depends on the readiness of the United States to 
assume the role of the leader.
After the initial period dominated by the eagerness to be strongly present 
and involved on the international scene, neoconservatives assumed a more neutral 
attitude and selected a certain ‘middle of the road’ course that was to avoid crusades 
in the name of democracy. It might seem that they denounced interventionism as 
a tool for conducting foreign policy, and acknowledged that the United States no 
1 E. Todd, Schyłek imperium. Rozważania o rozkładzie systemu amerykańskiego, Warszawa 2003, p. 20.
2 P. J. B uchanan, Prawica na manowcach, Wrocław 2005, pp. 20–21.
3 J. Eh rman, Neokonserwatyzm, Warszawa 2000, pp. 194–195.
271SEARCHING FOR THE JUSTIFICATION...
longer has to shoulder the responsibility for maintaining peace in Europe or chairing 
NATO. Nevertheless, the developments in the world proved that neoconservatives 
could not explicitly identify the interests of their country and decide when America 
should become involved and use its power. Situations would crop up when some 
neoconservatives supported the government’s interventions in international confli-
cts, while others were their stalwart opponents.
It goes without saying that after Ronald Reagan successive cabinets gover-
ning the United States used the agenda of the convictions that originated in the 
neoconservative thought despite the fact that both Bush and Clinton represented 
the passive attitude that assumed cooperation with other powers, and allowed use 
of force only in exceptional cases. The system of multi-polar international order 
established in the first half of the 1990s was still based on the dominance of Ame-
rica – the only superpower – that cooperated with a group of several states with 
decidedly lesser potentials.
The first acid test for the new order in international relations was Iraq’s in-
vasion on Kuwait in October 1990. George Bush, the 41st president of the United 
States, wrote that he was ready – should there be such need – to counteract the 
Iraqi–Kuwaiti crisis on his own. He wanted, however, the United Nations to par-
ticipate in the first reaction to the aggression and severely condemned the Iraqi 
attack against a UN member, as it would be of momentous significance. Despite the 
optimistic bias, he did not really know what to expect from the United Nations. He 
realized that this was to be the first test of the operation of the United Nations Secu-
rity Council in a crisis situation in the post-Cold War era.4 From this point of view, 
of great significance was the joint Soviet–American declaration that condemned the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait of 3 August 1990. It meant that the previous main suppor-
ter of Iraq did not support the aggression. It was a proof that for the first time since 
the beginning of the Cold War two superpowers were on the same side of a major 
international crisis.5 President Bush performed a master feat of diplomacy and gat-
hered a whole alliance of Arab States and NATO countries, composed of nearly 30 
states. The United States needed the support of Arab countries for all their activity 
in and around Persian Gulf, so as not to jeopardize the further development of good 
Arab–American relations or undermine the trust for America in the region. With the 
backing of Germany and Japan, support of the UN Security Council, and approval 
of the Congress, Bush ordered the commencement of the Desert Storm operation. 
After five weeks of air raids, the American ground forces needed no more than just 
100 hours to drive the Iraqi army from Kuwait, and march towards Baghdad.6
The war in the Persian Gulf was a certain bridge between the Cold War era 
and the new international order. A joint position of both superpowers was of historic 
significance and symbolic of the changing Soviet–American relations. The coopera-
4 G. B us h, B. S cow cro f t, Świat przekształcony, Warszawa 2000, p. 312.
5 Ibidem, p. 335.
6 P. Buchanan, op. cit., pp. 21–22.
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tion between the two countries allowed belief that the world would be built where 
the United Nations will be capable of working on the international scene and oppose 
aggressions in the manner envisaged by the authors of the Charter of the United 
Nations.7
This war provided arguments both for American multilateralists and uni-
lateralists. The multilateralists emphasized that the unanimity of the Permanent 
Representatives of the UN Security Council allowed the successful use of political 
and military instruments contained in the Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations that referred to the lawful employment of force in case of any threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression. Unilateralists, on the other hand, 
emphasized that the entire operation would have been impossible without the poli-
tical determination, and military and economic potential of America.8
Neoconservatives were inclined to agree with the claim put forth by Charles 
Krauthammer that the United States is the only state with military, diplomatic, po-
litical, and economic assets that allow assumption of the role of the decisive player 
by the US in any conflict wherever in the world it should occur.9 According to the 
neoconservatives, but also to the broad masses of the American society, the War 
in the Gulf was a proof that the United States is responsible in a special manner 
for leadership in solving international crisis situations. The fact of acquiring broad 
global support for the leading role of America in the world was highly significant. 
The political credibility and influences of the United States raised to a level that 
they had never reached before.10
Once the war was over, the support for the President in the American Society 
verged on 90%. The conflict in the Persian Gulf, contributed to the change in inter-
national reality and gave the United States the sense of fulfilling a mission, which 
US needed so very much. A proof of embracing the unipolar concept by Bush’s 
cabinet was the President’s address to the United Nations in October 1991, when he 
stated that he would not withdraw American army from the occupied areas and that 
he was beginning a crusade for the construction of the New World Order. The Uni-
ted States was to lead the United Nations in the supervision of the world, punishing 
the aggressors, and maintenance of peace. The mission of America was presented 
to the world, and Bush was ready to embark on his Wilsonic crusade.11
Believe that – using the experience of the previous term, and drawing from 
the neoconservative thought – George Bush led the United States on to a new path 
that was to help maintain American dominance on the international scene. The 41st 
President left a most clear heritage, whose continuators were and are successive 
US Presidents.
7 G. Bush, B. Scowcro f t, op. cit., p. 505.
8 W. Szymbor sk i, Doktryna Busha, Bydgoszcz 2004, p. 32.
9 Ch. Krau thammer, The Unipolar Moment, “Foreign Affairs. America and the World” 1990/1991.
10 G. Bush, B. Scowcro f t, op. cit., p. 505.
11 P. Buchanan, op. cit., p. 22.
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Although it seems otherwise, in its foreign policy, Clinton’s Democratic ca-
binet never abandoned the postulates of its predecessor and was highly active on 
the international scene. The Democratic administration of the White House belie-
ved the establishment of the new world order and American-style refurbishment of 
the international environment both right and necessary.
Besides the war in the Gulf, from the assumption of the presidential chair 
by George Bush to the presidency of his son, the United States became involved in 
Panama (1989: intervention that resulted in the removal of the authoritarian ruler, 
Manuel Noriega), intervened in Somalia, occupied Haiti, bombed Serbia, captured 
Kosovo, introduced soldiers into the territory of Saudi Arabia,12 began war on glo-
bal terrorism (Afghanistan), and was again involved in Iraq.
It is to be emphasized that neoconservatives perceive a powerful correlation 
between democracy and peace. The unquestioned expression of this view is the 
claim that operation for the benefit of democracy should pose an integral part of 
United States foreign policy. Even if there should be no correlation, on ideological 
ground America should still incline towards Wilson’s foreign policy. And indeed, 
Reagan’s, Bush’s, and Clinton’s administration made use of Wilson’s rhetoric and 
set Wilsonic goals before the United States. The differences between the successive 
governments concerned not the question whether to act for the benefit of democra-
cy, but the manner of such action. Republicans were slightly more hardliner in 
assessing where and under what conditions democracy may really come to exist.13
It is not difficult to assert that both the foreign policy of the United States 
and the manner it has been practiced over the last few decades carry strong brunt of 
neoimperialism. American commentators claim openly that the imperial wars, as 
the one in Yugoslavia or the one in Afghanistan, must be accompanied by new con-
quests, and that the chaos pervading the world is too dangerous to be treated lightly. 
The imperial logic seems to be incontrovertible. In his publications, Robert Kaplan, 
one of the leading of the American Empire, convinces that American leaders are 
capable of ensuring successful development in parts of the world lying far away 
from the United States should they remain under its graceful imperial sway.
It does seem that imperialistically tinted contemporary policy is an indis-
pensable consequence of embracing neoconservative beliefs in the field of foreign 
policy. The power of the empire provided the grounds for the idea of security of 
the United States. In the consolidated and enlightened leadership of America, the 
neoconservatives see a solution that may help to eliminate the sense of terror and 
contribute to the increased level of safety and security in the world and the develop-
ment of better conditions for the expansion of the freedom zone and democracy.
The neoconservative view on the questions concerning foreign policy may 
– according to Kristol – be recapitulated in a number of claims:
12 Ibidem, pp. 22–23.
13 F. Fukuyama, Ostatni człowiek z fiolki – po namyśle, after: www.tezeusz.pl/cms/tz/index.php?id=1250 
(December 2006).
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- patriotism: according to neoconservatives, it is a natural and healthy movement and 
it is the task of both the government and the private sector to stimulate and reinforce 
patriotism. This results from the assumption that Americans as an immigrant society 
need the sense of belonging.14 It is to be borne in mind that in the case of neoconser-
vatives, one may speak not only about a powerful patriotism, but even about nationa-
lism. This is followed by the belief in the superiority of American democratic values. 
To quote Irving Kristol, “patriotism flows from the love for the national past/history; 
nationalism is born from the hope for magnificent future”.15
- global government: the notion of such a government is considered abhorrent and 
leading to tyranny. Neoconservatives treat international institutions with high level 
of suspicion.16
- politicians/men of state: they must primarily be capable of distinguishing friends 
from enemies. Kristol emphasizes that it is not as easy as it would seem, quoting 
the experience of the Cold War and the fact that a large share of intelligent people 
could not treat the Soviet Union as an enemy.17
- National interest: neoconservatives exert pressure not to treat this term in its geo-
graphical sense. They believe that a large state, to the like of the United States, has 
a far broader or more distributed interests. Such a state inevitably has ideological 
interests, for which material premises are just an addition. Hence the conviction 
that United States are obliged to defend – if possible – the democratic nations in the 
strife against non-democratic powers, be they internal or external.18
- Military power: the overwhelming military power of the United States towards all 
the other states is, in the opinion of neoconservatives, incontrovertible. The suprema-
cy was not planned, and there are many Americans who do not believe it even today. 
It goes without saying, however, that during the five decades that have passed since 
the second world war, while Europeans maintained peaceful relations with the Soviet 
Union, the United States became involved in a long succession of wars: Korea, Viet-
nam, later the Persian Gulf conflict, Kosovo, and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. 
Such actions resulted in the increased arms expenditure, more or less proportional 
to the economic growth, while Europe continued to limit its arms expenditure, pro-
moting social programs. This contributed to today’s status quo, where in more than 
a decade from the downfall of the Iron Curtain, America is wielding a unique military 
power. 
Kristol emphasizes that this power is followed by responsibility, be it ac-
cepted or not. Moreover, he claims that if one has a power like the contemporary 
United States, either the United States will find its opportunity to use it or the world 
14 I. K r i s t o l, The Neoconservative persuasion: What it was, and what it is, “The Weekly Standard” 
2003, August 25, Vol. 8, Issue 47.
15 I dem, Reflections of a neoconservative, New York 1983, p. xiii.
16 I dem, The Neoconservative persuasion...
17 Ibidem.
18 Ibidem.
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will find it in their stead.19 It is not difficult to see that a new Conservatives, to-
day is the prevalent doctrine in American political scene and it seems necessary to 
emphasize that it has undergone a major evolution from the moment it was born as 
a worldview of Cold War liberals desiring powerful resistance against the Commu-
nist bloc to the time when it is a doctrine that bears traits of imperialism. 
The most distinguishing feature of neoconservatism in the last decades was 
the uncompromising position in the ideological controversy with the Communist 
bloc, which has recently lost its significance. Yet also at present, the neoconservati-
ve vision of American foreign policy continues to follow the hard line, with its cha-
racteristic features including uncompromisingness and portrayal of the world in the 
categories of friends and foes. Neoconservatives expertly use the moral and ideo-
logical justifications for current activities undertaken on the international scene. 
Besides this, they should be credited with a continuous and unflinching sense of 
Messianism and belief in the legal validity of policy aimed at the universalization 
of liberal democracy in the world. Neoconservatives tried to combine Wilson’s 
idealism in the promotion of American exemplars of democracy with a fascination 
in Rooseveltian concept of interventionism in foreign policy, which in our day be-
stows them with a markedly militaristic image.20
Today, such an attitude raises vast controversies. Proliferation of democracy 
with the use of force and coercion does not bring the expected results everywhere 
and immediately. Can liberty and democracy be imposed by power?
The presidency of Ronald Reagan came in a very special period. He was 
a politician determined to put an end to the “empire of evil”. His actions were direc-
ted against the main and greatest – if at that time, not the only – enemy. War in the 
name of democracy and liberty was enthusiastically embraced both by the West and 
the societies of eastern Europe who longed for liberation. War against Communism 
was universal in its character, and wherever it was fought it meant struggle for the 
freedom of societies and freedom of individuals.
I believe that the contemporary situation is decidedly different, and that run-
ning his crusade in the name of liberty and operating in distinctly different geopo-
litical, cultural, and primarily mental and historical conditions, Bush Junior will 
hardly achieve victory or fail. The nations and societies whose political culture has 
never been a participative one, which for many years have been dominated by the 
culture of dependence, if not parochialism, are hard to be activated, encouraged, 
and convinced to the “western model” of the state and its organization. The national 
character, and the political culture related to it are hard to change, and the manner 
that the United States is trying to effect that change seems particularly ineffecti-
ve. The democratic crusade wherever possible, and negotiations where there is no 
other way out21 – this may be a short characteristic of the doctrine currently binding 
19 Ibidem.
20 W. Szymbor sk i, op. cit., p. 75.
21 M. F i t a -Czuchnowska, Jastrzębie demokracji, “Wprost” 2005, July 3.
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in American foreign policy. The terrorist attacks of 11th September 2001 were fol-
lowed by a radical change in the American strategy of security: that was the end of 
the transitory period between the Cold War strategy of containing Communism and 
Bush Doctrine. The initial period of his presidency, which lacked a global vision 
and had Bush clinging to a realistic point of view, with the maintenance of stability 
being most crucial and ambitions to change the world invisible, was followed by 
the era whose unchallenged priority was the guarantee of national safety and secu-
rity, restoration of the superpower reputation, and the United States’ due place in 
the international system.22
Dominant today, neoconservatism is a peculiar form of reborn Reaganism: 
a dynamic mélange of authority and principles; combination of the American ca-
pacity to overthrow regimes with the evangelical belief that democracy is the only 
proper system; characterized by the faith in the unquestioned power of America.23 
Worth answering is the question whether considering contemporary neoconserva-
tism that has dominated American policy a conservative trend is indeed justified. 
The actions undertaken by neoconservative decision makers, at least in a number 
of areas, seem to challenge this claim:24
- first of all, the conviction that American leadership is capable of changing regimes 
and political systems,
- secondly, the search for ideological justifications for current foreign policy,
- finally, lack of attachment to the role of community and society.
With these in mind, reiterating the earlier statement that imperialism and 
warmongering than neoconservatism are more proper when referring to the con-
temporary American leadership seems justified.
The global vision of American foreign policy after the events of the 11th 
September and accounting for the major elements of the new American doctrine 
(known as Bush Doctrine) found its full and complete expression in the National 
Security Strategy, published in September 2002.25
The new strategy rejected doctrines of determent and containment that won 
the cold war and announced a new American policy of the preventive strike. It as-
sumes potential preventive attack against the states that may threaten the security of 
the United States. Following Bush’s concept, Americans may resort to such a strike 
against terrorist groups and organizations, or against hostile countries in possession 
of weapons of mass destruction or researching construction of such weapons. The 
strategy assumes the need to plan and prepare American forces to such a preventive 
action.
22 W. Szymbor sk i, op. cit., pp. 63, 72.
23 Ibidem, p. 78.
24 J. S mi th, Ought the Neo-Cons Be Properly Considered Conservatives? A Philosophical Response, 
“Journal of Contemporary Analysis” 2003, No. 75 (6), pp. 32–33, 40.
25 For original, see: www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/html.
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Generalizing, one may also point that one of Bush’s fundamental declara-
tions contained in the new global strategy of foreign policy was vesting the United 
States with the right to restrain other countries in the development and growth of 
their power that could challenge their strategic supremacy of America. That was 
tantamount to the claim that Bush administration was not planning to renounce the 
military cutting edge that United States retained after the fall of the Soviet Union. 
Americans are planning to use the unquestioned supremacy in the world in a uni-
lateral manner. Even at the expense of a conflict with allies and the international 
community.
The foundations of the American doctrine binding in international policy 
may be gathered in the following three statements: promotion of democracy, pre-
ventive strikes, and unilateral action.
Planning a defensive preventive attack when the country is facing an immi-
nent threat is nothing out of the ordinary. In the case of United States – the most 
powerful state in the world, at whose disposal lies a greater defensive power than in 
the case of any other country – it is not prudent to empower itself with the right to 
preventive attack and treat such a situation as a rule as this rallies the world’s public 
opinion against the United States. Instead of focusing on the actual threat, this gives 
birth to a discussion concerning the generally conceived right to intervene at all.26
It seems that the American strategy of security and preventive war fails to 
account for the reality we live in, where the military power has lost its significance 
and in many cases can hardly be used to solve the complex political and security-
related questions we face in the contemporary world. It was rightly remarked that 
as far as the uncompromising attitude in the ideological struggle against Commu-
nism was an advantage of neoconservatism throughout the period of the cold war, 
the current hard-line and inflexible position of the United States in foreign policy 
leads to numerous distortions that in the final result may contribute to the drop in 
America’s prestige and power on the international scene.
Moreover, the doctrine does not look ahead to see that action without the 
consent of the allies is not feasible from the physical point of view. The United 
States maintains hundreds of military bases all over the world, and operation from 
these bases may hardly ever be conducted independently of the will of the states, in 
whose territories the bases are situated. Thus strategic allies and their support, be 
it only passive, are necessary for any action. America assuming a position above 
the international law and order is too risky for the White House administration, and 
such a step will rather not be undertaken, and it’s so not without a prior political 
campaign (as in the case of Iraq), which in turn rules out of the element of surprise, 
that is crucial for the concept of the preventive attack.27
26 Rozmowa z Richardem Holbrooke, “Gwałt na gwałt”, “Wprost” 2002, November 3.
27 T. Wid ł ak, Ameryka kontratakuje – nowa doktryna obronna USA, after: www.paneuropa.l.pl/?plus= 
komentator&id=1063729003 (November 2006).
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The new US National Security Strategy of March 2006 proves a greater rea-
lism in the assessment of challenges and ways of facing them than the one drafted 
in 2002. Although it invariably remains a “war” strategy with reference to the times 
of Cold War (The parallel between war on terror and the Cold War is ever more 
apparent: 
The United States is in the early years of a long struggle, similar to what our country faced 
in the early years of the Cold War. […] a new totalitarian ideology now threatens […] Its content 
may be different from the ideologies of the last century, but its means are similar: intolerance, mur-
der, terror, enslavement, and repression 
and confirms the doctrine of the preventive strike, it also refers to the new 
threats. There is more emphasis on effective multilateralizm and non-military me-
ans of policy. It is slightly less pervaded with the spirit of neoconservatism and 
more realistic in its approach to the threats and ways of opposing them. The major 
change is the greater emphasis on multilateral actions and diversification of instru-
ments used to influence the international milieu. Both in the case of terrorism and 
weapons of mass destruction is on the one hand, and natural disasters “efficient 
multilateral effort” is defined as key to solve these problems.28
Closing, it is worth to quote America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, 
and the Neoconservative Legacy,29 the latest book of Francis Fukuyama, and repeat 
the four basic beliefs, on which today’s neoconservative worldview is based upon. 
First, America is obliged to defend democracy and human rights. This is why it has 
the right to intervene with the internal policy of the states that do not respect these 
standards. Second, American may use its power for moral reasons. Thirdly, inter-
national institutions – as e.g. the United Nations – are inefficient and nothing good 
can be expected from them. Fourthly, the results of high-flying social engineering 
often unexpectedly turn against itself, which can be understood as the need to avoid 
sudden top to bottom changes in the society.
28 E. Pose l -Częśc ik, Strategia bezpieczeństwa Stanów Zjednoczonych z 16 marca 2006 roku, “Biu-
letyn Polskiego Instytutu Spraw Międzynarodowych” 2006, No. 19 (359).
29 F. Fukuyama, Ameryka na rozdrożu. Demokracja, władza i spuścizna neokonserwatyzmu, War-
szawa 2006.
